A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation
AbstractWe propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long-term contract that has to be renegotiated after the realization of the state of the world, they take the initial contract as a reference point to which they compare gains and losses of the renegotiated transaction. We show that loss aversion makes the renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long-term contracts. First, it explains why parties often abstain from writing a beneficial long-term contract or why some contracts specify transactions that are never ex post efficient. Second, it shows under what conditions parties should rely on the allocation of ownership rights to protect relationshipspecific investments rather than writing a specific performance contract. Third, it shows that employment contracts can be strictly optimal even if parties are free to renegotiate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 14191.
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Renegotiation; Incomplete Contracts; Reference Points; Employment Contracts; Behavioral Contract Theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Herweg, Fabian & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2012. "A Theory of Ex Post Inefficient Renegotiation," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 390, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics; Underlying Principles
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-11-11 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2012-11-11 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HRM-2012-11-11 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2012-11-11 (Microeconomics)
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