AbstractCustom is a key factor for economic performance. Social and economic institutions build on it. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the motivational force of custom per se, as brought about by history. History creates entitlements, and these influence behavior. Custom is thus understood as a set of behavioral dispositions inherited from the past. In this, the present considerations deviate from earlier approaches that take custom as being stabilized by external rewards and sanctions alone
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Munich, Department of Economics in its series Munich Reprints in Economics with number 3163.
Date of creation: 1993
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of institutional and theoretical economics 1 149(1993): pp. 178-203
Custom; conventions; social capital; entitlements;
Other versions of this item:
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1992. "On Custom," Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute of Economics (VWL) 37769, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1992. "On Custom," Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics 37769, Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute of Economics (VWL).
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