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Joint Estimation of Mark-up and Bargaining Power Parameters for Belgian Manufacturing

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Author Info
Sabien Dobbelaere

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Abstract

This paper applies several extensions of Hall’s (1988) methodology to analyse imperfections in both the product and the labour market for firms in the Belgian manufacturing industry over the period 1988-1995. We investigate (1) the heterogeneity in mark-up and bargaining power parameters among 17 sectors within the manufacturing industry, (2) whether higher bargaining power parameters are associated with higher mark-ups and (3) whether both parameters are influenced by cyclical and competition effects. Our GMM results indicate that ignoring imperfection in the labour market leads to an underestimation in the price-cost margin of Belgian manufacturing firms. These findings are confirmed in the sectoral analysis. As expected, higher bargaining power parameters are associated with higher price-cost margins at the sectoral level. We find that both the mark-up and the bargaining power parameter move procyclically. Finally, after controlling for cyclical effects, our results show that the introduction of a new competition policy in Belgium in 1993 has exerted a statistically significant negative effect on the price mark-ups, leaving the bargaining strength of the workers unchanged. Hence, the stringent competition law seems to have disciplined firms?pricing behaviour.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven in its series LICOS Discussion Papers with number 12102.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:lic:licosd:12102

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Related research
Keywords: Efficient Bargaining; Price Setting; Market Power; Competition Policy; Enterprise Behaviour;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C23 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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  2. Konings, Jozef & Van Cayseele, Patrick & Warzynski, Frederic, 2001. "The dynamics of industrial mark-ups in two small open economies: does national competition policy matter?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 841-859, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Sabien Dobbelaere, 2001. "Insider Power and Wage Determination in Bulgaria An Econometric Investigation," LICOS Discussion Papers 11101, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, K.U.Leuven. [Downloadable!]
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