Can Euroland Survive?
AbstractSocial unrest across Europe is growing as Euroland's economy collapses faster than the United States', the result of falling exports and a weaker fiscal response. The controversial title of this brief is based on a belief that the nature of the euro itself limits Euroland's fiscal policy space. The nations that have adopted the euro face "market-imposed" fiscal constraints on borrowing because they are not sovereign countries. Research Associate Stephanie A. Kelton and Senior Scholar L. Randall Wray foresee a real danger that these nations will be unable to prevent an accelerating slide toward depression that will threaten the existence of the European Union.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Levy Economics Institute in its series Economics Public Policy Brief Archive with number ppb_106.
Date of creation: Nov 2009
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2009-11-27 (European Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2009-11-27 (Post Keynesian Economics)
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