Corruption, Fertility, and Human Capital
AbstractWe build an overlapping generations model in which reproductive households face a child quantity/child quality trade-off and bureaucrats are delegated with the task of delivering public services that support the accumulation of human capital. By integrating the theoretical analyses of endogenous growth, corruption and fertility choices, we offer a novel mechanism on the driving forces behind demographic transition. In particular, we attribute it to the endogenous change in the incidence of bureaucratic corruption that occurs at different stages of an economy?s transition towards higher economic development.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/28.
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision: Apr 2011
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics University of Leicester, University Road. Leicester. LE1 7RH. UK
Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887
Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908
Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
- J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- O41 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2011-04-23 (Development)
- NEP-DGE-2011-04-23 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-HRM-2011-04-23 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-SOC-2011-04-23 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, 2002. "Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in Africa," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 183-209, November.
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