On the utility representation of asymmetric single-peaked preferences
AbstractWe introduce two natural types of asymmetric single-peaked preferences, which we name biased-above and biased-below, depending on whether the asymmetry (or preference-bias) favors alternatives above or below the peak. We de.ne a rich family of utility functions, the generalized distance-metric utility functions, that can represent preferences biased-above or biased-below, besides accommodating any degree of asymmetry. We also identify restrictions on differentiable utility representations that guarantee the underlying preferences to be biased-above or below, and allow to compare degrees of asymmetry. Finally, we consider a specific application -agents preferences over government size- to illustrate the role of factors such as risk aversion and tax distortions in shaping asymmetric preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 11/18.
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision: Jul 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Francisco Martínez-Mora & M. Socorro Puy, 2011. "On the Utility Representation of Asymmetric Single-Peaked Preferences," Working Papers 2011-03, FEDEA.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
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- Ruge-Murcia, Francisco J, 2003.
" Inflation Targeting under Asymmetric Preferences,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(5), pages 763-85, October.
- Francisco J. Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Banco de Espaï¿½a Working Papers 0106, Banco de Espa�a.
- Francisco Javier Ruge-Murcia, 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," IMF Working Papers 01/161, International Monetary Fund.
- RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco .J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche 2001-04, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ruge-Murcia, F.J., 2001. "Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences," Cahiers de recherche 2001-04, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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