Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory
Abstract
Homo Strategicus populates the vast plains of Game Theory. He knows all logical implications of his knowledge (logical omniscience) and chooses optimal strategies given his knowledge and beliefs (rationality). This paper investigates the extent to which the logical capabilities of Homo Sapiens Sapiens resemble those possessed by Homo Strategicus. Controlling for other-regarding preferences and beliefs about the rationality of others, we show, in the laboratory, that the ability of Homo Sapiens Sapiens to perform complex chains of iterative reasoning is much better than previously thought. Subjects were able to perform about two to three iterations of reasoning on average.Download Info
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 08/16.Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision: Nov 2008
Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:08/16
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Related research
Keywords: iterative reasoning; depth of reasoning; logical omniscience; rationality; experiments; other-regarding preferences;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2008-04-29 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2008-04-29 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2008-04-29 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-KNM-2008-04-29 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-UPT-2008-04-29 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
References
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008.
"Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty,"
Discussion Papers in Economics
08/2, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
- Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
- Ludovic Renou & Karl Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Economics Working Papers 1087, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ralph-C Bayer, 2006.
"Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition,"
School of Economics Working Papers
2006-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics.
- Bayer, Ralph-C., 2010. "Intertemporal price discrimination and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 273-293, February.
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