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Group formation and governance

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Author Info
Ludovic Renou ()

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Abstract

This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo. This paper therefore suggests that unanimity, often blamed for the European inertia of the last two decades, was only a scapegoat.

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File URL: http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp07-7.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Leicester in its series Discussion Papers in Economics with number 07/07.

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Date of creation: Jun 2007
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Handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:07/7

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Related research
Keywords: groups coalitions alliances endogenous formation cost reduction loss of control governance unanimity majority

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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