Gebaudeversicherung in England
AbstractThe paper studies property insurance in Britain. It emphasises the following points. In the case of terrorism insurance the government decided to provide cost free stop loss insurance, to prevent the market from breaking down. When the country was hit by subsidence damages, the premiums and excesses for the owners concerned rose dramatically. The fact that contracts can be renegotiated every year, means that the owners have only a very incomplete insurance cover. In Montserrat the insurance companies simply decided to cancel all their policies, when it became clear that the volcano might well destroy every building on the island.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 9815.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 1998
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, Gebäudeversicherung in Europa - Die Grenzen des Wettbewerbs, Haupt Verlag, 2002, pp. 23-62
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
Phone: ++41 21 692.33.64
Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
More information through EDIRC
Britain; property insurance; terrorism; risk selection; subsidence; duration of insurance contracts;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- L8 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2001. "Die Vorteile des Staatsmonopols in der Gebäudeversicherung: Erfahrungen aus Deutschland und der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(1), pages 31-44, 02.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Claudine Delapierre Saudan).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.