The article re-examines the proposition, first formulated by Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybcvig ( 1983), that in a production economy with stochastic liquidity shocks to the household sector, banks serve to provide optimal intertemporal insurance to consumers. The paper argues that in order to understand the moral hazard problems inherent in this insurance problem, it is too narrow to consider solely the role of banks as providers of liquidity. The paper develops a model with several investment opportunities in which banks have the additional function of asset diversification.
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Length: 22 pages Date of creation: Feb 1996 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in European Economic Review, vol. 41 (7), July 1997, pp. 1355-1374 Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:9606
Find related papers by JEL classification: D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
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