Governance und Unabhängigkeit von Nationalbanken: das Beispiel der Schweizerischen Nationalbank
AbstractWe argue that there is a natural trade-off between the independence and the accountability of a central bank. Economist's emphasis on the independence aspect has contributed to creating situations, where the central banks' accountability is largely deficient. Attempts to resolve this issue by giving the central bank a clear legal mandate are no solution. A central bank with insufficient accountability can violate its legal mandate. We illustrate this by comparing the lagela rules defining the Swiss central bank's profit distribution with its actual behaviour over the last 3 decades.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP in its series Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) with number 03.01.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
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Postal: Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP, Internef, CH-1015 Lausanne
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Fax: ++41 21 692.33.05
Web page: http://www.hec.unil.ch/deep/publications/cahiers/series
More information through EDIRC
central bank; independence; accountability; profit distribution;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-13 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1981. "Central bank behavior : A positive empirical analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 291-315.
- Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper F. & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2008.
"Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6888, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Frisell, Lars & Roszbach, Kasper & spagnolo, giancarlo, 2008. "Governing the Governors: A Clinical Study of Central Banks," Working Paper Series 221, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
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