This note shows that a public pension system with a fairly general individual tax-benefit linkage is (computationally) equivalent to a system without linkages. The "equivalent" pension system without linkages does not only facilitate simulations of policy experiments, but also offers some insight into the implied tax structure of the tax-benefit linkage.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: 12 pages Date of creation: Jul 2000 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol.4 (3), July 2002, pp. 405-415 Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:00.20
Find related papers by JEL classification: D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)