Does renegotiation of financial contracts matter for shareholders? Empirical evidence from Europe
AbstractUsing a large sample of bank loan renegotiations by European firms, I show that renegotiation of financial contracts matters for shareholders and can increase their wealth. I find that amendments to financial covenants and to loan amounts increase borrower’s cumulative abnormal return by 10% to 15%. Early and less frequent renegotiations of bilateral loans with short maturity also imply a positive stock market reaction. Amendments signaling the early accrual of new, valuable and positive information allow increasing shareholders value. The renegotiation of financial contracts bears a certification role as contracts become more efficient over time, to the benefits of the shareholders.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg (France) in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2013-03.
Date of creation: 2013
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More information through EDIRC
renegotiation; financial contracts; bank loans; shareholders value; event studies; Europe.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-02-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2013-02-16 (Banking)
- NEP-EUR-2013-02-16 (Microeconomic European Issues)
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