Retailing regulation via parking taxation
AbstractThis paper explores the idea to regulate retailing industry through a tax on the store parking size. In Western economies, retailers use common resources (land use, road networks) contributing to the store accessibility that they do not pay for. This kind of free riding gives gross merchandisers and hypermakets a competitive advantage which establishes undue market power while creating, presumably, inefficiencies when social cost is taken into account. Hence the idea to tax the parking, which is a proxy measure of the accessibility resources used by the retailer. By using a standard model of horizontal differentiation, we explore the impact of parking taxation in a monopoly and in duopoly and we characterize optimal taxation policies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2011-06.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
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spatial competition; optimal taxation; parking;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
- R10 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2011-09-22 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2011-09-22 (Regulation)
- NEP-URE-2011-09-22 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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