Do Islamic Banks Have Greater Market Power ?
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to investigate whether Islamic banks have greater market power than conventional banks. Indeed Islamic banks may benefit from a captive clientele, owing to religious principles, which would be charged greater prices. To measure market power, we compute Lerner indices on a sample of banks from 17 countries in which Islamic and conventional banks coexist over the period 2000-2007. Comparison of Lerner indices shows no significant difference between Islamic banks and conventional banks. When including control variables, regression of Lerner indices even suggests that Islamic banks have a lower market power than conventional banks. A robustness check with the Rosse-Panzar model confirms that Islamic banks are not less competitive than conventional banks. The lower market power of Islamic banks can be explained by their different norms and their different incentives.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg (France) in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2009-02.
Date of creation: 2009
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Islamic banks; Lerner index; Bank Competition.;
Other versions of this item:
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ARA-2009-02-14 (MENA - Middle East & North Africa)
- NEP-BAN-2009-02-14 (Banking)
- NEP-COM-2009-02-14 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CWA-2009-02-14 (Central & Western Asia)
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