El Dilema de Condorcet - el Problema de la Votación por Mayoría Simple de Duncan Black - la Paradoja De Kenneth Arrow - y el Manejo de Agenda
AbstractThis paper reviews the familiar “dilemma of Condorcet”, dealing with the voting by simple majority problem, studied by Duncan Black and Kenneth Arrow, to highlight the importance of a discretionary manipulation of the political agenda in a representative democracy. The dilemma is used to explain the presidential election outcome of Argentina in 2003 and to warning the relevance of the enforcement of permanent rules of procedure in social decisions making, namely, respect for the Constitution and democratic institutions designed under its principles.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata in its series Department of Economics, Working Papers with number 076.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2009
Date of revision:
Condorcet; voting paradox; agenda manipulation; public choice.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H0 - Public Economics - - General
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- Kenneth J. Arrow, 1950. "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 328.
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