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Employment contracts and effort: why do temporary workers take less absence?

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Author Info
Steve Bradley
Colin Green
Gareth Leeves

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Abstract

There is growing evidence that the nature of employment contracts, in particular the degree of employment protection, affects worker effort. Using personnel data drawn from a large public sector labour force, we investigate whether, and through which channels, temporary employment contracts influence worker absence. Specifically, we focus on the role of risk of job loss and the availability of opportunities for conversion to permanent contracts. We demonstrate that a large proportion (68% to 69%) of the temporary-to-permanent absence differential can be explained by observable and unobservable individual and workplace characteristics. However, some contract specific effect on absenteeism cannot be accounted for. Risk of job loss and promotion opportunities have significant and separate effects on temporary workers' absence.

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Paper provided by Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department in its series Working Papers with number 005102.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:005102

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Keywords: Absenteeism; Effort; Temporary Contracts;

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Alison L. Booth & Marco Francesconi & Jeff Frank, 2002. "Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones Or Dead Ends?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F189-F213, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Tim A. Barmby & Marco G. Ercolani & John G. Treble, 2002. "Sickness Absence: An International Comparison," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F315-F331, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Riphahn, Regina T. & Thalmaier, Anja, 1999. "Behavioral Effects of Probation Periods: An Analysis of Worker Absenteeism," IZA Discussion Papers 67, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  4. Steve Bradley & Colin Green & Gareth Leeves, 2004. "Worker absence and shirking: evidence from matched teacher-school data," Working Papers 000271, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Ichino, Andrea & Maggi, Giovanni, 2000. "Work Environment And Individual Background: Explaining Regional Shirking Differentials In A Large Italian Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 2387, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bridges, Sarah & Mumford, Karen, 2001. "Absenteeism in the UK: A Comparison across Genders," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 69(3), pages 276-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Ichino, Andrea & Riphahn, Regina T., 2001. "The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: A Comparison of Absenteeism During and After Probation," IZA Discussion Papers 385, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  8. Engellandt, Axel & Riphahn, Regina T., 2005. "Temporary contracts and employee effort," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 281-299, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Arai, Mahmood & Thoursie, Peter Skogman, 2005. "Incentives and selection in cyclical absenteeism," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 269-280, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Emanuela Ghignoni, 2008. "Temporary contracts, employees’ effort and labour productivity: the evidence for Italy," Working Papers 111, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Public Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2008. "Worker Absenteeism and Incentives: Evidence from Italy," MPRA Paper 16858, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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