Dealing with Risks and Governance
AbstractThe scope of this note is to delimitate what we are talking about when we refer to governance, a word that relates to different concepts in political sciences, social sciences and other human sciences. Within such a large meaning, governance encompasses many situations where there are risks to be managed, or risks to be taken, which leads us to question its economic foundations. However, the foundations need not be the same if we consider “corporate governance”, “national governance”, “territorial governance” and many compound ways of management through Public Private Partnerships (PPP).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 13-10.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2013
Date of revision: Oct 2013
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