Mixed strategies in an unprofitable game: an experiment
AbstractWe report experimental data from a two-player, two-action unprofitable game with an unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Our design allows subjects to explicitly choose probability distributions over actions. Patterns of play differ greatly from the mixed strategy equilibrium and the maxmin strategy profiles, both when measured as subjects’ choices of probability distributions, and as the resulting actions played. The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) concept is a good predictor of the subjects' average choices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 11-19.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2011
Date of revision: Nov 2011
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