Internet access and investment incentives for broadband service providers
AbstractThis paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in order to show how di¤erent pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality " can increase economic e¢ ciency by allowing more investment of access providers and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. We show that departing from the "net neutrality", where at rates are used, introducing termination fees can increase incentives to invest for the ISP and enhance social surplus. Keywords : Network neutrality, Flat rates, Termination fees.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 11-09.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2011
Date of revision: Apr 2011
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Other versions of this item:
- Baranes, Edmond & Poudou, Jean-Christophe, 2011. "Internet access and investment incentives for broadband service providers," 22nd European Regional ITS Conference, Budapest 2011: Innovative ICT Applications - Emerging Regulatory, Economic and Policy Issues 52196, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-05-07 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-NET-2011-05-07 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, 2004. "Sender or Receiver: Who Should Pay to Exchange an Electronic Message?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 423-447, Autumn.
- Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, 2007.
"Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis,"
07-14, NET Institute, revised Sep 2007.
- Economides, Nicholas & Tåg, Joacim, 2012. "Network neutrality on the Internet: A two-sided market analysis," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 91-104.
- Nicholas Economides & Joacim Tåg, 2007. "Net Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis," Working Papers 07-45, NET Institute, revised Nov 2007.
- Economides, Nicholas & Tåg, Joacim, 2008. "Network Neutrality on the Internet: A Two-sided Market Analysis," Working Paper Series 727, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 09 Nov 2011.
- Chris Edmond, 2007. "Information Revolutions and the Overthrow of Autocratic Regimes," Working Papers 07-26, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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