The REDD scheme to curb deforestation: A well-designed system of incentives?
AbstractBioprospection is, largely, meant to help reducing deforestation and, the other way around, stopping deforestation enhances the prospects of bioprospection. The need for a global agreement to the problem of tropical deforestation has led to the REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) scheme, which proposes that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through avoided deforestation and degradation. The remaining issue at stake is to definer the rules defning payments to countries reducing their deforestation rate. This article develops a game-theoretic bargaining model, simulating the on-going negotiation process which is currently taking place within the Convention of Climate Change, after the Copenhagen agreement of December 2009. It shows that the conditions under which developing countries are left to bargain over the allocation of the global forest fund may lead to an ineffective system of incentives. Below a given level of contributions from the North, the mechanism fails to curb the deforestation. Beyond this level, it induces perverse effects: the larger the North's contribution, the larger the deforestation rate. Consequently, the mechanism is most effective only at a specifc threshold level which, given the unobservability of countries'preferences, can only be found by a repeated "trial and error" implementation process.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 10-06.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2010
Date of revision: Jun 2010
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Other versions of this item:
- Figuieres, Charles & Leplay, Solenn & Midler, Estelle & Thoyer, Sophie, 2012. "The REDD Scheme to Curb Deforestation: A Well-designed System of Incentives?," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 239-257, September.
- Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
- Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2010-06-26 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2010-06-26 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-06-26 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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"North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme,"
UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 12-31, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Working Papers 2012.89, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2012. "North / South Contractual Design through the REDD+ Scheme," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
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