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Wealthy people do better? Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Time Preference Heterogeneity and the Effect of Wealth in Renewable Common-Pool Resources Exploitation

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Gastón A. Giordana

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Abstract

Aiming to better characterize the exploitation behavior of renewable common-pool resources, in this paper we explore alternative hypothesis about the valuation of the future by the agents and the possibility of heterogeneous behavior on this regard. To do this, we further analyze the experimental data of an N-person discrete-time deterministic dynamic game of T periods fixed duration. Firstly, we consider the homogeneous case where withdrawers’ rate of time preference is symmetrically determined. Then, we calibrate the best fitting model assuming alternatively, exogenous and endogenous time preference. The exogenous time preference case is the traditional assumption in modeling intertemporal choices, i.e. every period, players discount future values at the same level. In the endogenous case, we statistically model the reduced form of the discount factor as a transformation of a second order polynomial on wealth. Secondly, we further explore the endogenous case looking forward to assess the extent of heterogeneity in the rate of time preference formation process. Dynamic problems resolution gives scope for the implementation of ‘rules of thumb’ as a consequence of its' intrinsic complexity. Then, in order to identify the different decisions rules and to classify appropriators within them, we implement a Bayesian classification algorithm based on Houser et al (2004) work. The application of this econometric procedure has allowed us to identify two types of appropriators: “Quasi Myopic” (QM) appropriators and “Disrupted Farsighted” (DF) appropriators. The algorithm has classified near 85% of the appropriators in our sample as QM, and 5% as DF; the lasting agents could not be identified. We used the fitted empirical model to perform simulations. Some results are: (i) initial wealth increase the average efficiency of exploitation; (ii) when initial wealth is high (low), a more equally (unequally) distribution of wealth between types results in higher efficiency in the exploitation of the resource.

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Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 08-10.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2008
Date of revision: Jul 2008
Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:08-10

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  1. Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Wealth inequality and collective action," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1843-1874, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Daniel Houser & Michael Keane & Kevin McCabe, 2004. "Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence Using a Bayesian Type Classification Algorithm," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 781-822, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. John Geweke & Michael Keane & David Runkle, 1994. "Alternative computational approaches to inference in the multinomial probit model," Staff Report 170, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 1997. "The Endogenous Determination of Time Preference," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 729-58, August.
  5. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Gastón Giordana & Marc Willinger, 2007. "Fixed Instruments to Cope with Stock Externalities An Experimental Evaluation," Working Papers 2007.72, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  7. Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1994. "On the Endogenous Determination of Time Preference," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 98, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
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  8. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1997. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: Part I: The Unregulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 451-82, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
  10. Herr, Andrew & Gardner, Roy & Walker, James M., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Time-Independent and Time-Dependent Externalities in the Commons," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 77-96, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1999. "The Ambiguous Impact of Inequality on Local Resource Management," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 773-788, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2003. "Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 263-289, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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