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The role of players’ identification in the population on the trusting and the trustworthy behavior an experimental investigation

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  • Dimitri Dubois
  • Marc Willinger

Abstract

We study to what extent identification does matter for trustfulness and trustworthiness to emerge in a population of players. Our experimen- tal protocol is designed for isolating the effects of trustees’ identification. Trustees’ identification is a necessary condition for introducing a reputation mechanism. We run three treatments. In each treatment groups 6 players interact repeatedly and randomly and play a 30 periods investment game (Berg & al. 1995). In the first treatment players can’t identify each other, in the second one players can identify each other as trustee and in the third one players identify each other both as trustee and trustor. We show that, according to the expectation, trustees’ identification has a positive effect on reciprocity. However it doesn’t affect the average trust in the population. Trust is significantly higher than in the complete anonymous treatment only when players identify each other in both roles. We show that this enhance of trust is the result of mutual trust-reciprocity relationships formation.

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File URL: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2007-06.pdf
File Function: First version, 2007
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 07-06.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2007
Date of revision: Jun 2007
Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:07-06

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  1. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Sopher, Barry & Strand, Paul, 2002. "Cooperation in social dilemmas, trust and reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 231-249, April.
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  3. Gary Bolton & Elena Katok & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "How Effective are Online Reputation Mechanisms?," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-25, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
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  9. Resnick, Paul & Zeckhauser, Richard & Swanson, John & Lockwood, Kate, 2003. "The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment," Working Paper Series rwp03-007, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
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  19. Engle-Warnick, Jim & Slonim, Robert L., 2004. "The evolution of strategies in a repeated trust game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 553-573, December.
  20. Guth, Werner & Ockenfels, Peter & Wendel, Markus, 1997. "Cooperation based on trust. An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 15-43, February.
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  23. McKelvey, Richard D & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1992. "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 803-36, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Pierre Courtois & Tarik Tazdaït, 2011. "Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective," Working Papers 11-06, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2011.

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