Obtaining a Unique, Efficient Norm Through Negotiation by Linking Porposals
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier in its series Working Papers with number 05-02.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2005
Date of revision: Jan 2005
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Avenue Raymond Dugrand, CS 79606, 34960 Montpellier Cedex 2
Web page: http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1999.
"Costly bargaining and renegotiation,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
9910, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
- Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, 2004. "A Model of Forum Shopping, with Special Reference to Standard Setting Organizations," NBER Working Papers 10664, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1984.
"Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation,"
345, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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