The Analysis of Pre-play Communication under Adaptive Conjectures
AbstractThis paper examines the sets of strategies that are stable for a stochastic process in cheap talk 2×2 coordination games. Relaxing the rationality condition assumed in previous literature and instead assuming what we call adaptive conjecture, we show that efficient outcomes are more difficult to achieve in medium term analysis. In addition, the outcomes that survive in the long term are Evolutionary Stable Sets, and in the medium term they are Neutrally Stable Strategies. Periodically each agent has an opportunity to change her strategy to one deemed more successful against the current population based on conjectures that are not always identical to the true action off the equilibrium path. Even if the message set is large enough, both efficient and inefficient equilibrium outcomes are stable in contrast to the results of previous literature where only efficient outcomes are stable.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series KIER Working Papers with number 652.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC
coordination games; communication; evolution; efficiency; cheap talk; Evolutionary Stable Set; Neutrally Stable Strategy.;
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Akihisa Shibata).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.