This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Dynamic environmental taxes in an international duopoly

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Shuichi Ohori () (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University)
Abstract

This paper studies a dynamic game of environmental taxes between two countries in a Cournot duopoly. Based on the assumption of linear demand functions, we demonstrate that the environmental tax in the steady-state equilibrium is lower in a dynamic environmental tax game than in a static environmental one. Therefore, the dynamic behavior of the governments results in an increase in the environmental damage. Further, as a result of international cooperation on environmental taxes between two countries in the first period, there is an increase in the optimal environmental tax; this is due to the decrease in the effect of the rent-shifting.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/DP/DP628.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research in its series Working Papers with number 628.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 13pages
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:628

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yoshida-Honmachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto 606-8501
Phone: +81-75-753-7102
Fax: +81-75-753-7193
Email:
Web page: http://www.kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp/eng/index.html
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Akihisa Shibata).

Related research
Keywords: environmental tax dynamic programming international duopoly

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Benford, Frank A., 1998. "On the Dynamics of the Regulation of Pollution: Incentive Compatible Regulation of a Persistent Pollutant," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 1-25, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 1994. "Export subsidies under dynamic duopoly," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1139-1151, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Walz, Uwe & Wellisch, Dietmar, 1997. "Is free trade in the interest of exporting countries when there is ecological dumping?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 275-291, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nannerup, Niels, 2001. "Equilibrium pollution taxes in a two industry open economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 519-532, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Shuichi Ohori, 2006. "Optimal Environmental Tax and Level of Privatization in an International Duopoly," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 225-233, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Moledina, Amyaz A. & Coggins, Jay S. & Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2,supplem), pages 356-376, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Use the JEL tree to browse through the database by subfields.

This page was last updated on 2008-9-4.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.