Debt as a Regulatory Constraint
AbstractThis paper is about using specific investments and secured debt to shield a firm from exploitation by a regulatory authority. It is shown that specific investments and secured debt constrain the regulatory authority in its choice of regime, by providing a credible threat of bankruptcy.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 99-02.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Øster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark
Phone: (+45) 35 32 30 10
Fax: +45 35 32 30 00
Web page: http://www.econ.ku.dk
More information through EDIRC
regulation; financial structure; hold-up problems;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-03-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENT-2002-03-04 (Entrepreneurship)
- NEP-MIC-2002-03-04 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2002-03-04 (Regulation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Hoffmann).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.