The paper considers the problem of modelling voting situations, seeking models and equilibrium concepts which are easier to incorporate in large sequential decision games than the models and solution concepts suggested by the "theory of voting". The paper demonstrates that one can avoid using very refined solution concepts (such as sophisticated outcomes), if voting is modelled like a roll-call, so each agent is assumed to know the votes of the agents who have voted before him. In single stage games, i.e. voting games with just two alternatives, we find that the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in a game with open voting is equal to the set of sophisticated outcomes in the corresponding game with secret voting. In multistage games with more alternatives and a fixed agenda, the set of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of multistage sophisticated outcomes.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
90-16.
Length: 30 pages Date of creation: Sep 1990 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9016
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