A well-known impossibility theorem in social choice theory states that every non-dictatorial social choice function, assigning a unique alternative from a set of at least three to every profile of individual preferences, can be manipulated. In this paper we examine a particular family of social choice functions, the scoring functions, and show that the failure frequency of such functions, understood as the relative frequency of profiles for which the social choice is undefined or can be manipulated, goes to zero as the number n of individuals becomes large. Moreover, the rate of convergence can be established as n(raised to the -1/2 power).
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number
89-10.
Length: 14 pages Date of creation: Mar 1989 Date of revision: Publication status: Published as: "A Note on Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness", in: Economics Letters 31(4), December 1989, pp. 307-312. See also: "Erratum [A Note on Asymptotical Strategy-Proofness]", in: Economics Letters 32(1), January 1990, pp. 105 Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:8910
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