National Responses to Transnational Terrorism: Intelligence and Counterterrorism Provision
AbstractIntelligence about transnational terrorist threats is generally gathered by national agencies. I set up and analyze a game theoretic model to study the implications of national intelligence gathering for the provision of domestic (defensive) counterterrorism when two countries are facing a transnational terrorist threat. It is shown that, relative to a benchmark case where all intelligence is commonly known, national intelligence gathering often leads to increased overprovision, although it can be the other way around. By extending the model with a com munication stage, I also explore the possibilities for intelligence sharing prior to decisions on counterterrorism provision. If verifiable sharing is a viable option for each country, there exists an equilibrium with full intelligence sharing. On the other hand, if only cheap talk communication is possible then full sharing cannot happen in equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 12-22.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 15 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
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Transnational Terrorism; Counterterrorism; Intelligence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-06 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan, 2007. "Politics and the Suboptimal Provision of Counterterror," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(01), pages 9-36, January.
- Sandler, Todd & Enders, Walter, 2004. "An economic perspective on transnational terrorism," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 301-316, June.
- Todd Sandler & Kevin Siqueira, 2006. "Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre-emption," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1370-1387, November.
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