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The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy

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Author Info
Matthew Baker (Department of Economics, Hunter College - City University of New York)
Erwin Bulte (Development Economics Group, Wageningen University)
Jacob Weisdorf (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)

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Abstract

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/Research/Publications/pink/2006/0625.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 06-25.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
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Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0625

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Related research
Keywords: origins of institutions; common defense; raiding; hunter-gatherers; SCCS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


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