Strategic Assortment Reduction by a Dominant Retailer Strategic Assortment Reduction by a Dominant Retailer
AbstractIn certain product categories, large discount retailers are known to offer shallower assortments than traditional retailers. In this paper, we investigate the competitive incentives for such assortment decisions and the implications for manufacturers’ distribution strategies. Our results show that if one retailer has the channel power to determine its assortment first, then it can strategically reduce its assortment by carrying only the popular variety while simultaneously inducing the rival retailer to carry both the specialty and popular varieties. The rival retailer then bears higher assortment costs, which leads to relaxed price competition for the commonly carried popular variety. We also show that when the manufacturer has relative channel power, it chooses alternatively to distribute both product varieties through both retailers. Our analysis suggests, therefore, that when a retailer becomes dominant in the distribution channel, it facilitates retail segmentation into discount shops, carrying limited product lines, and specialty shops carrying wider assortments. We also illustrate how retailer power leading to strategic assortment reduction can lead to lower consumer surplus.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number 2007-07.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
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channels of distribution; channel power; assortment; retailing; game theory;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-08-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2007-08-08 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2007-08-08 (Economics of Strategic Management)
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- Ma, Lidan & Zhang, Rong & Guo, Sandang & Liu, Bin, 2012. "Pricing decisions and strategies selection of dominant manufacturer in dual-channel supply chain," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 2558-2565.
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