This paper considers the effect of monopoly-promoting export cartels on domestic production. It is argued that export cartels facilitate tacit collusion by monitoring defections more efficiently. This slackesn the incentive constraint of tacit collusion. Optimizing firms competing both in the domestic and export markets will often use the icnreased possiblity for collusion in both markets. A condition is given under which this is the case.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number
1999-04.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: Feb 1999 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in: Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 2(3), 223-246, 2002 Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1999-04
Find related papers by JEL classification: L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
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