This paper explores a generalized spatial voting model in which parties are not supposed to be identical before the game. This new approach to the political market leads to substantial changes in parties' strategies. Our model provides new explanations of why parties may choose non median policies, i.e. other than that preferred by the median voter. It also provides explanations on why elections may not lead to close races.
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Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics in its series CIE Discussion Papers with number
1998-12.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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