On the Incidence of Employment Subsidies to Vocational Training
AbstractThe present paper analyses employment subsidies to vocational training under union wage bargaining. The analysis includes an investigation of the consequences of financing the subsidy by a levy on employment, which is the typical way of financing these types of subsidies in many countries. The paper demonstrates high incidence rates of subsidies to vocational training under standard assumptions about the preference structure of the union. The financing scheme appears to counteract the purpose of the subsidy.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics in its series CAM Working Papers with number 2010-02.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision:
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2010-03-06 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2010-03-06 (Labour Economics)
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