Announcements and Credibility of Monetary Policy
AbstractAn infinitely repeated monetary policy game … la Barro and Gordon (1983) is considered. Before the game starts the government announces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability that government is honest and a slight probability that the government makes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government will have average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentially rational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 96-06.
Date of creation: Jun 1996
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Other versions of this item:
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Cem Mehmet Baydur & Bora Suslu & Selahattin Bekmez, 2004. "The independence of central bank in view of Rogoff: The Turkish experience," European Research Studies Journal, European Research Studies Journal, vol. 0(1-2), pages 143-.
- R. Cellini & L. Lambertini, 2003. "On the Dynamic Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy," Working Papers 463, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
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