Bargaining with a Property Rights Owner

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Bargaining with a Property Rights Owner

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Yair Tauman (Tel Aviv University and Stony Brook University)
Andriy Zapechelnyuk () (Kyiv School of Economics)

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Andriy Zapechelnyuk

Abstract

We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. Every solution is characterized by a fraction a. Every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are a and 1-a, respectively, uniformly over all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaing surplus. The solution for a=1/2 is the nucleolus of a naturally related game in characteristic form.

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Paper provided by Kyiv School of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 1.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:kse:dpaper:1

Note: Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2008-02-09 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2008-02-09 (Game Theory)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Kamien, Morton I. & Tauman, Yair & Zamir, Shmuel, 1990. "On the value of information in a strategic conflict," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 129-153, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Buch, Ishay & Tauman, Yair, 1992. "Bargaining with a Ruler," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 131-48.
Yair Tauman & Naoki Watanabe, 2007. "The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 135-149, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Sen, Debapriya & Tauman, Yair, 2007. "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 163-186, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Debapriya Sen & Yair Tauman, . "General licensing schemes for a cost-reducing innovation," Department of Economics Working Papers 02-03, SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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