Efficient Dynamic Matching with Costly Search
AbstractThis paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a non-trivial, full trade search equilibrium is shown to exist, equilibria are characterized as the values that satisfy the first order conditions for a non-linear planner’s (optimization) problem, and necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the existence of efficient search equilibria under complete information. These results fully generalize to the two-sided incomplete information setting, under an additive separability condition.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum in its series Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers with number 1030.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2010
Date of revision:
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- Carlos Canon, 2011. "Matching & Information Provision by One-Sided and Two-Sided Platforms," Working Papers 11-20, NET Institute, revised Oct 2011.
- Lauermann, Stephan, 2011.
"Dynamic matching and bargaining games: A general approach,"
31717, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stephan Lauermann, 2013. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(2), pages 663-89, April.
- Max Planck Institute & Stephan Lauermann, 2007. "Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 269, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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