Financial Risks and Research Contracts in a Model of Endogenous Growth
AbstractThis paper examines researchers' choices between either collaborating with venture capitalists (Regime C) or going independently (Regime I), and how their interaction affects long-run endogenous growth, in an economy characterized by incomplete contracts and financial market imperfections. Both research and production require labor and physical capital. We find that an improvement in financial regulation leads to a higher rate of innovation under Regime I. In contrast, an improvement in R&D incentives for researchers in Regime C can coincide with either an increase or a decrease in the long-run rate of innovation, due to the holdup problem in post bargaining over created value. We also rank the growth rates in the two regimes under different contractual and financial environments. Finally, we find that conflicts can arise when entrepreneurs choose one regime based on investment incentives but the other regime provides a higher growth rate.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number DP2010-08.
Date of creation: Mar 2010
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501 JAPAN
Phone: +81-(0)78 803 7036
Fax: +81-(0)78 803 7059
Web page: http://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/index-e.html
More information through EDIRC
Firm-asymmetry; Endogenous Growth; R&D; Incomplete Contracts; Financial Imperfection;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Office of Promoting Research Collaboration, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.