Commitments and Contests: a Game-Theoretic Perspective on Japanese Vertical Relationships
AbstractVarious arrangements in vertical relationships have evolved in different countries to attain efficient trading relationships. Vertical relationships in Japan can be identified to have distinctive characteristics in several aspects compared with those in other countries. This study is a comprehensive understanding of Japanese vertical relationships based on the economic theory, particularly game theory and various empirical findings. Insights on the efficiency and governance mechanisms of the vertical relationships can be gained by investigating various arrangements of the vertical relationships from a game-theoretic perspective.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 110.
Length: 92 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2000
Date of revision:
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Japan; Game theory; Industrial structure;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- O53 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
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- Schmid, Frank A. & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2003. "Mergers and acquisitions in Germany: Social-setting and regulatory framework," CFS Working Paper Series 2003/28, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
- Frank A. Schmid & Mark Wahrenburg, 2002. "Mergers and acquisitions in Germany," Working Papers 2002-027, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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