This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Deterring gaming with imperfect evaluation methods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Gerald Eisenkopf () (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz)
Abstract

This paper introduces and discusses an idea which minimizes gaming or manipulation activities, if payments are linked to results from manipulative methods. The idea is to add nonmanipulable information to manipulable information to improve the evaluation of a given output. A score declining in increasing evaluation quality indicates gaming and allows to estimate the true result. A simple linear incentive scheme is introduced in which a high evaluation score is rewarded. The introduced mechanism dominates any single evaluation method. However, limited liability restricts its applicability. If agents are risk-averse, the principal should let each agent decide, which evaluation method he prefers.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://w3.ub.uni-konstanz.de/v13/volltexte/2006/1724//pdf/0604.pdf
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 500 Can't connect to w3.ub.uni-konstanz.de:80 (connect: timeout). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Gerald Eisenkopf)
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim in its series Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor with number 06-04.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 26 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:knz:hetero:0604

Contact details of provider:
Postal: D-78457 Konstanz
Phone: +49 7531 88 2314
Web page: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/forschergruppewiwi
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Gerald Eisenkopf).

Related research
Keywords: Gaming ; Manipulation ; Evaluation ; Risk Aversion ; Research Management ; Agency Theory;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
M40 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Accounting - - - General
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "Tournaments versus Piece Rates under Limited Liability," Discussion Papers 15, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-56, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Besley, Timothy J. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4641, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 2003. "Inequity Aversion in Tournaments," Cahiers de recherche 0322, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2003. "Schneewittchen im Land der Klapperschlangen: Evaluation eines Evaluators," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 4(2), pages 177-190, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Each page is provided with a technical contact, in case something is not right with the supplied information. See under "publisher info".

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.