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Tempting Righteous Citizens? On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions

Author

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  • Tim Friehe

    (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that increasing the expected sanctions for a crime may increase this crime's prevalence, using a principal-agent model with different crimes. The intuition is that the policy change may increase the principal's expected payoff from crime by decreasing the information rent required by the agent.

Suggested Citation

  • Tim Friehe, 2011. "Tempting Righteous Citizens? On the Counterintuitive Effects of Increasing Sanctions," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2011-09, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    • Handle: RePEc:knz:dpteco:1109
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    File URL: http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_Friehe-9-11.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Crime; principal-agent relation; information rent;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies

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