• NEP-ALL-2000-02-28 (All new papers)
• NEP-IND-2000-02-28 (Industrial Organization)
• NEP-PUB-2000-02-28 (Public Finance)

1. Smith, Alasdair & Venables, Anthony J., 1988. "Completing the Internal Market in the European Community: Some Industry Simulations," CEPR Discussion Papers 233, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Smith, Alasdair & Venables, Anthony J., 1988. "Completing the internal market in the European Community : Some industry simulations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 32(7), pages 1501-1525, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Margaret E. Slade, 1995. "Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(2), pages 368-402, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Slade, M.E., 1993. "Empirical Games: The Oligopoly Case," UBC Departmental Archives 93-31, UBC Department of Economics.
3. Steen, Frode & Sorgard, Lars, 1999. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian cement market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(9), pages 1775-1796, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Steen, F & Sorgard, L, 1996. "Semicollusion in the Norwegian Cement Market," Papers 10/96, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
4. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Lommerund, K.E. & Sorgard, L., 1998. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 0198, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
   Other versions:
   • Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sorgard, Lars, 2001. "Trade Liberalization and Cartel Stability," Review of International Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 343-55, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Froot, Kenneth A & Klemperer, Paul D, 1989. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 637-54, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kenneth A. Froot & Paul Klemperer, 1989. "Exchange Rate Pass-Through When Market Share Matters," NBER Working Papers 2542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1990. "Tax harmonization and tax competition in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 489-504, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Hans-Werner Sinn, 1991. "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe," NBER Working Papers 3248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Lockwood, Ben, 1993. "Commodity tax competition under destination and origin principles," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 141-162, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lockwood, Ben, 1992. "Commodity Tax Competition Under Destination and Origin Principles," CEPR Discussion Papers 733, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Siebert, Horst & Koop, Michael J, 1993. "Institutional Competition versus Centralization: Quo Vadis Europe?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 15-30, Spring.
10. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax Competition and Leviathan," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
    • Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and leviation," IFS Working Papers W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
11. Julio J. Rotemberg & Garth Saloner, 1989. "Tariffs vs Quotas with Implicit Collusion," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 22(2), pages 237-44, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Michael Keen & Ravi Kanbur, 1991. "Jeux sans frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
13. Guttorm Schjelderup & Lars Sorgard, 1997. "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 277-290, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Marvel, Howard P, 1982. "Exclusive Dealing," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 1-25, April.
15. Keen, Michael, 1989. "Pareto-improving indirect tax harmonisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Pinto, Brian, 1986. "Repeated games and the reciprocal dumping model of trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(3-4), pages 357-366, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Mintz, Jack & Tulkens, Henry, 1986. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 133-172, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
19. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1998. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 323-350, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Michael Keen & Sajal Lahiri, 1994. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," IFS Working Papers W94/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    • Michael Keen and Sajal Lahiri, . "The Comparison Between Destination and Origin Principles Under Imperfect Competition," Economics Discussion Papers 424, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
20. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.

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1. Schindler, Dirk & Schjelderup, Guttorm, 2007. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Discussion Papers 2007/8, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Dirk Schindler & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "Harmonization of Corporate Tax Systems and Its Effect on Collusive Behavior," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(4), pages 599-621, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)