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The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox

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  • Wolfgang Eggert

    ()
    (University of Konstanz and CESifo)

  • Martin Kolmar

    (University of G¨ottingen and CESifo)

Abstract

This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimaltaxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, different to the existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public-good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz in its series CoFE Discussion Paper with number 03-07.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:knz:cofedp:0307

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Keywords: tax competition; information exchange;

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References

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  1. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1991. "International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 3152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September.
  3. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
  4. Sinn, Stefan, 1992. "Saving-Investment Correlations and Capital Mobility: On the Evidence from Annual Data," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1162-70, September.
  5. Bovenberg, A.L. & Gordon, R.H., 1996. "Why is capital so immobile internationally? Possible explanation and implications for capital income taxation," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73564, Tilburg University.
  6. Feldstein, Martin & Horioka, Charles, 1980. "Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 90(358), pages 314-29, June.
  7. Ken Binmore, 1998. "Game Theory and the Social Contract - Vol. 2: Just Playing," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 2, number 0262024446, January.
  8. Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with interregional differences in factor endowments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 423-451, November.
  9. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-80, May.
  10. Bacchetta, Philippe & Espinosa, Maria Paz, 1995. "Information sharing and tax competition among governments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 103-121, August.
  11. KEEN, Michael & MARCHAND, Maurice, 1996. "Fiscal Competition and the Pattern of Public Spending," CORE Discussion Papers 1996001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. John F. Helliwell & Ross McKitrick, 1998. "Comparing Capital Mobility Across Provincial and National Borders," NBER Working Papers 6624, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  14. Bayoumi, Tamim A. & Rose, Andrew K., 1993. "Domestic savings and intra-national capital flows," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 1197-1202, August.
  15. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 39-72, January.
  16. Stefan Homburg, 1999. "Competition and Co-ordination in International Capital Income Taxation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(1), pages 1-17, March.
  17. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2002. "Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 465-482, August.
  18. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  19. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2005. "Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  2. Thomas Hemmelgarn & Gaëtan Nicodème, 2009. "Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive," Working Papers CEB 09-023.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  3. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation," Discussion Paper 2004-54, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Marcel Gérard, 2004. "Combining Dutch Presumptive Capital Income Tax and US Qualified Intermediaries to Set Forth a New System of International Savings Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1340, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Lars Gläser & Martin Halla, 2008. "Die EU-Zinsenrichtlinie: Ein Schuss in den Ofen?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(1), pages 83-101, 02.
  6. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2008. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 103-122, July.
  7. Schwarz, Peter, 2009. "Why are countries reluctant to exchange information on interest income? Participation in and effectiveness of the EU Savings Tax Directive," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 97-105, June.
  8. Marcel GERARD & Lucia GRANELLI, 2013. "From the EU Savings Directive to the US FATCA, Taxing Cross Border Savings Income," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2013007, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  9. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January.
  10. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2006. "Macroeconomic effects of banking secrecy when tax evasion is endogenous," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
  11. Ligthart, Jenny E., 2007. "Information sharing for consumption tax purposes: An empirical analysis," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 24-42, March.

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