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The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox

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Author Info
Wolfgang Eggert () (University of Konstanz and CESifo)
Martin Kolmar (University of G¨ottingen and CESifo)

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Abstract

This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimaltaxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital-income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, different to the existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public-good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz in its series CoFE Discussion Paper with number 03-07.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2003
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Handle: RePEc:knz:cofedp:0307

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Related research
Keywords: tax competition; information exchange;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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  1. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 163-180, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Marcel Gérard, 2004. "Combining Dutch Presumptive Capital Income Tax and US Qualified Intermediaries to Set Forth a New System of International Savings Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Manfred Gärtner & Frode Brevik, 2006. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-19, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2005. "Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  6. Thomas Hemmelgarn & Gaëtan Nicodème, 2009. "Tax Co-ordination in Europe: Assessing the First Years of the EU-Savings Taxation Directive," Working Papers CEB 09-023.RS, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management, Centre Emile Bernheim (CEB). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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