This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Double Taxation, Tax Credits and the Information Exchange Puzzle

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Wolfgang Eggert () (Department of Economics, University of Konstanz)
Abstract

This paper analyzes the choice of taxes and international information exchange by governments in a capital tax competition model. We explain situations where countries can choose tax rates on tax savings income and exchange information about the domestic savings of foreigners, implying that the decentralized equilibrium is efficient. However, we also identify situations with adverse welfare properties in which information exchange is compatible with zero taxes on capital income. The model helps to identify the linkage between voluntary information exchange and the choice of tax rates. It is shown that the recent development in information exchange treaties may not be useful to overcome the inefficiencies caused by decentralized tax setting.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cofe.uni-konstanz.de/Papers/dp03_06.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz in its series CoFE Discussion Paper with number 03-06.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:knz:cofedp:0306

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Fach D 147, D-78457 Konstanz
Phone: +49-7531-88-2204
Fax: +49-7531-88-4450
Web page: http://cofe.uni-konstanz.de
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://cofe.uni-konstanz.de

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Ingmar Nolte).

Related research
Keywords: withholding tax; tax credit; international tax competition; information exchange;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Marcel Gérard, 2004. "Combining Dutch Presumptive Capital Income Tax and US Qualified Intermediaries to Set Forth a New System of International Savings Taxation," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Apart from a small start up grant in the 1990's, RePEc has received no funding and lives on the help of volunteers.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.