The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may help mitigate these problems. Focusing on the ‘federal’ allocation of competencies it is argued that traditional economic theories of federalism should be complemented by contract-theoretic and transaction-cost-political approaches. There has been some progress in recent years in developing such a ‘new economic theory of federalism’. Basic ideas and some insights of this theory are discussed with regard to the appropriate ‘federal’ allocation of competencies for the regulation of the European network industries.
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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number
977.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Access Pricing and Competition,"
Working papers
94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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