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Regulation of Europe's Network Industries: The Perspective of the New Economic Theory of Federalism

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  • Frank Bickenbach

Abstract

The paper starts with a description of major reforms of EU policy in the network industries. Based on the normative economics of regulation, it then points out generic information and transaction cost problems of regulatory policy making. An appropriate allocation of regulatory competencies may help mitigate these problems. Focusing on the ‘federal’ allocation of competencies it is argued that traditional economic theories of federalism should be complemented by contract-theoretic and transaction-cost-political approaches. There has been some progress in recent years in developing such a ‘new economic theory of federalism’. Basic ideas and some insights of this theory are discussed with regard to the appropriate ‘federal’ allocation of competencies for the regulation of the European network industries.

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File URL: http://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/regulation-of-europe-s-network-industries-the-perspective-of-the-new-economic-theory-of-federalism/kap977.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 977.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:977

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Related research

Keywords: Network industries; regulation; asymmetric information; incomplete contracts; economic models of federalism;

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References

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  1. Antonio Estache & J. Cremer & Paul Seabright, 1996. "Decentralizing Public Services: What can we learn from the Theory of the Firm?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/44016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1992. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," IDEI Working Papers 22, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1996. "The Firm as a Multicontact Organization," Papers 95.390, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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  6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1998. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 6726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Mark Armstrong & Simon Cowan & John Vickers, 1994. "Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510790, December.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  9. Bickenbach, Frank, 1998. "Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Wirtschaftsverfassung für Netzinfrastrukturen: Ausgangssituation, Veränderungen und offene Fragen," Kiel Working Papers 896, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  10. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 2001. "Competition in Telecommunications," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262621509, December.
  11. Frank Bickenbach, 1999. "Regulierung und Wettbewerb im Bereich der Netzinfrastrukturen: Begründung, Regeln und Institutionen," Kiel Working Papers 910, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  12. Paul L. Joskow, 2006. "Incentive Regulation for Electricity Networks," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(2), pages 3-9, 07.
  13. J-J. Laffont & J. Tirole, 1994. "Access Pricing and Competition," Working papers 95-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 673-684, May.
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Cited by:
  1. Krieger-Boden, Christiane, 2002. "European integration and the case for compensatory regional policy," ERSA conference papers ersa02p240, European Regional Science Association.
  2. Hartenberger, Ute, 2007. "Auf dem Weg zum transnationalen Regulierungsregime? Eine Analyse am Beispiel der Regulierung des Telekommunikationsmarktes," TranState Working Papers 52, University of Bremen, Collaborative Research Center 597: Transformations of the State.
  3. Kumkar, Lars, 2000. "Zur institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Strommarktregulierung: Brauchen wir eine eigenständige Regulierungsbehörde für den Stromtransport?," Kiel Discussion Papers 371, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  4. Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "The European Electricity Market: Centralization of Regulation or Competition between Regulatory Approaches?," Kiel Discussion Papers 387, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  5. Lars Kumkar, 1999. "Zur zukünftigen Regulierungspolitik für die deutsche Stromwirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 929, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

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