The New Institutional Economics of Antitrust and Regulation
AbstractHybrid governance structures between markets and hierarchies in many industries, e.g., in energy and telecommunications, challenge antitrust and regulation policy. The paper focuses on the theoretical and methodological basis provided by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) for analyzing the economics of complex vertical and horizontal coordination problems. It sketches the specific view of NIE at industrial organization, antitrust and regulation, discusses three current issues Â— the European policy concerning complex vertical contracts, regulatory reform of the electricity industry and the allocation of regulatory competencies in the EU Â— and presents some implications of NIE for economic policy making, research and advisory activities.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 961.
Length: 65 pages
Date of creation: Dec 1999
Date of revision:
New institutional economics; antitrust; regulation; incomplete contracts; regulatory reform; economic models of federalism.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schmidtchen, Dieter, 2005. "Der "more economic approach" in der Wettbewerbspolitik," CSLE Discussion Paper Series 2005-04, Saarland University, CSLE - Center for the Study of Law and Economics.
- Kumkar, Lars, 2000. "Zur institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Strommarktregulierung: Brauchen wir eine eigenständige Regulierungsbehörde für den Stromtransport?," Kiel Discussion Papers 371, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Kumkar, Lars, 2002. "The European Electricity Market: Centralization of Regulation or Competition between Regulatory Approaches?," Kiel Discussion Papers 387, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- von Hirschhausen, Christian R. & Opitz, Petra, 2001. "Power utility re-regulation in East European and CIS transformation countries (1990 - 1999): An institutional interpretation," Discussion Papers 2001/7, Technische Universität Berlin, School of Economics and Management.
- Christian von Hirschhausen & Petra Opitz, 2001. "Power Utility Re-regulation in East European and CIS Transformation Countries (1990-1999): An Institutional Interpretation," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 246, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Neugebauer, Andrea, 2002. "Divergierende Fallentscheidungen von Wettbewerbsbehörden: Institutionelle Hintergründe," Arbeitspapiere 26, Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.