This paper starts by analyzing the consequences that technical and economic characteristics of network industries have for the relationship between competition and regulation in these industries. A discussion of alternative regulatory rules shows that normative regulatory economics does not provide results specific and robust enough to serve as concrete rules for regulatory policy. Thus, questions of the appropriate institutions of regulatory policy and the vertical (federal) and horizontal allocation of regulatory competencies come to the fore. However, there are no simple answers to these questions either. The paper suggests, that a "transaction cost politics" approach might help to base the analysis of regulatory institutions on a more solid theoretical basis than traditional normative or public choice approaches (economic theories of federalism, interest group theories etc.) are able to provide.">
In diesem Papier werden zunächst die Konsequenzen diskutiert, die die ökonomischen und technischen Besonderheiten der Netzinfrastrukturen für das Verhältnis von Markt, Wettbewerb und Regulierung in diesen Sektoren haben. Die anschließende Diskussion "optimaler" Regulierungsregeln macht deutlich, daß die normative Regulierungsökonomik keine Ergebnisse liefert, die hinreichend robust und spezifisch sind, um der Politik als konkrete Handlungsanweisung dienen zu können. Damit gewinnen Fragen nach der angemessenen vertikalen (föderalen) und horizontalen Verteilung der Regulierungskompetenzen und der institutionellen Ausgestaltung der Regulierungspolitik an Bedeutung. Gerade für die Regulierung der Netzinfrastrukturen bieten sich jedoch keine einfachen Antworten auf diese Fragen an. Es wird angeregt, verstärkt auf neue "transaktionskostenpolitische" Modellansätze zurückzugreifen, um die Analyse institutioneller Alternativen der Regulierungspolitik auf eine solidere theoretische Grundlage zu stellen, als dies auf der Basis traditioneller (polit-)ökonomischer Ansätze (ökonomische Föderalismustheorie, Theorie der Politikbeeinflussung etc.) möglich ist.
This paper starts by analyzing the consequences that technical and economic characteristics of network industries have for the relationship between competition and regulation in these industries. A discussion of alternative regulatory rules shows that normative regulatory economics does not provide results specific and robust enough to serve as concrete rules for regulatory policy. Thus, questions of the appropriate institutions of regulatory policy and the vertical (federal) and horizontal allocation of regulatory competencies come to the fore. However, there are no simple answers to these questions either. The paper suggests, that a "transaction cost politics" approach might help to base the analysis of regulatory institutions on a more solid theoretical basis than traditional normative or public choice approaches (economic theories of federalism, interest group theories etc.) are able to provide.
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Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number
910.
Length: 100 pages Date of creation: Feb 1999 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:910
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