Strategisches Nachverhandeln zur Lösung von Anreizproblemen in unvollständigen Verträgen am Beispiel der Wohnungsprivatisierung nach dem Altschuldenhilfegesetz
AbstractGovernments may draft contracts with market agents for allocating subsidies and pursuing specific policy goals. Contract enforcement via binding commitments is difficult, however, when exogenous (environmental) and endogenous (behavioural) risks interact. Analyzing the old debt compromise in east German housing, it results that a sophisticated design of contractual incompleteness may provide a reasonable safeguard against opportunistic behaviour. Yet it involves considerable costs and still does not guarantee that policy goals are achieved. The crucial policy question is if contracts can be drafted without creating a one-sided holdup potential or if governments should not co-operate with market agents but commit to policy rules.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 901.
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- P20 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - General
- P30 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sander, Birgit, 1997. "Vertragliche Vereinbarungen als Instrument der Wirtschaftspolitik am Beispiel des Altschuldenkompromisses in der ostdeutschen Wohnungswirtschaft," Kiel Working Papers 838, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
- Huberman, Gur & Kahn, Charles M, 1988. "Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 471-84, June.
- Huberman, Gur & Kahn, Charles M., 1988. "Strategic renegotiation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 117-121.
- Morten Hviid, 1998. "Relational Contracts, Repeated Interaction and Contract Modification," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 179-194, March.
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