Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Capital mobility, tax competition, and lobbying for redistributive capital taxation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lorz, Jens Oliver

Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of international capital mobility on redistributive capital taxation and on lobbying activities by interest groups. It employs a model where different capital endowments lead to a conflict between households concerning their most preferred capital tax rate. Three main results are derived: First, redistributive source based capital taxes or subsidies decline as international tax competition intensifies. Second, lobbying activities of certain interest groups may explain international differences in the capital tax rate. Third, capital mobility may lead to declining lobbying activities of interest groups and thus may be welfare increasing for all households.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/47109/1/257856501.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Kiel Institute for the World Economy in its series Kiel Working Papers with number 779.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:779

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Kiellinie 66, D-24105 Kiel
Phone: +49 431 8814-1
Fax: +49 431 85853
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifw-kiel.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Tax competition; interest groups; redistribution;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dixit, Avinash K, 1986. "Comparative Statics for Oligopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(1), pages 107-22, February.
  2. Wildasin, David E., 1989. "Interjurisdictional capital mobility: Fiscal externality and a corrective subsidy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 193-212, March.
  3. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  4. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  5. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  6. Gerber, Robert I. & Hewitt, Daniel P., 1987. "Tax competition and redistribution policy of local governments competing for business capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 69-82, January.
  7. Siebert, Horst & Koop, Michael J., 1990. "Institutional competition: a concept for Europe?," Kiel Working Papers 440, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  8. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701, October.
  9. Tullock, Gordon, 1971. "The Cost of Transfers," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 629-43.
  10. Ghosh, Atish R., 1991. "Strategic aspects of public finance in a world with high capital mobility," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 229-247, May.
  11. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1991. "Efficient investment incentives in the presence of capital flight," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 171-181, August.
  12. Oates, Wallace E. & Schwab, Robert M., 1988. "Economic competition among jurisdictions: efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 333-354, April.
  13. Stefan Sinn, 1992. "The taming of Leviathan: Competition among governments," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 177-196, March.
  14. McLure, Charles E, Jr, 1969. "The Inter-regional Incidence of General Regional Taxes," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , , vol. 24(3), pages 457-85.
  15. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
  16. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
  17. Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1989. "International Tax Competition and Gains from Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 3152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Hoyt, William H., 1991. "Property taxation, Nash equilibrium, and market power," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 123-131, July.
  19. Coughlin, Peter J & Mueller, Dennis C & Murrell, Peter, 1990. "Electoral Politics, Interest Groups, and the Size of Government," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(4), pages 682-705, October.
  20. Rauscher, Michael, 1996. "Interjurisdictional competition and the efficiency of the public sector: The triumph of the market over the state?," Kiel Working Papers 732, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Eggert, Wolfgang & Sørensen, Peter Birch, 2008. "The effects of tax competition when politicians create rents to buy political support," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1142-1163, June.
  2. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2005. "Heterogenous Groups and Rent-Seeking for Public Goods," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers), LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 2005.16, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
  3. Lorz, Oliver, 2001. "On the effects of capital mobility on local infrastructure policy and rent-seeking," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 319-337, April.
  4. Marcel Gérard & Fernando M.M. Ruiz, 2009. "Corporate Taxation and the Impact of Governance, Political and Economic Factors," CESifo Working Paper Series 2904, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Wolfgang Eggert & Peter Birch Sørensen, 2007. "The Effects of Tax Competition when Politicians Create Rents to Buy Political Support," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 07-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Cheikbossian, Guillaume, 2008. "Rent-seeking, spillovers and the benefits of decentralization," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 217-228, January.
  7. Feld, Lars P, 2000. " Tax Competition and Income Redistribution: An Empirical Analysis for Switzerland," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 105(1-2), pages 125-64, October.
  8. Raghbendra Jha & Hari K. Nagarajan & Kolumum R. Nagarajan, 2013. "Fiscal Federalism and Competitive Bidding for Foreign Investment as a Multistage Game," Departmental Working Papers, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics 2013-04, The Australian National University, Arndt-Corden Department of Economics.
  9. Siebert, Horst, 2000. "The paradigm of locational competition," Kiel Discussion Papers 367, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  10. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(539), pages 1143-1161, 07.
  11. Lai, Yu-Bong, 2010. "The political economy of capital market integration and tax competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 475-487, December.
  12. Eckhard Janeba & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2002. "Why Europe Should Love Tax Competition - and the U.S. Even More So," NBER Working Papers 9334, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Lorz, Jens Oliver, 1998. "On the effects of factor mobility on local infrastructure policy and rent-seeking," Kiel Working Papers 850, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  14. Yu-Bong Lai, 2014. "Asymmetric tax competition in the presence of lobbying," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 66-86, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kie:kieliw:779. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dieter Stribny).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.